The Court of Prizes
Introduction
Some parts of American law are so old that they seem to belong to another country, or another Constitution. For centuries, governments at war have captured enemy ships and cargo at sea. Rather than allowing military officials to decide automatically who owned the captured property, the United States historically used specialized prize courts to determine whether a seizure was lawful and what should happen to the property.¹
Now, that nearly forgotten system may be returning. The Justice Department is preparing to revive prize-court procedures as the United States seeks to seize Iranian oil tankers and cargo during its conflict with Iran, according to Bloomberg Law. The department is reportedly considering the Southern District of Texas as a venue for proceedings involving captured vessels and their cargo.²
The development raises a question that reaches far beyond the current conflict: Can a legal system created for nineteenth-century naval warfare still govern the seizure of property in a twenty-first-century conflict?
What Is a Prize Court?
A prize court is a civilian court that determines the legal status of property captured during wartime. The principle is relatively simple. A military force may seize a vessel, but seizure alone does not necessarily make the property the government's. Historically, a court had to determine whether the capture was legally justified and whether the property could be condemned as a lawful prize.³
This judicial role distinguished prize law from ordinary confiscation. The government could not simply declare captured property its own. The legality of the capture had to be adjudicated.
That principle reflected a broader constitutional idea: even during war, government power over property remained subject to law.
America's First Prize Courts
Prize law became particularly important during the Civil War. President Abraham Lincoln's blockade of Confederate ports generated thousands of captures involving ships and cargo suspected of supporting the Confederacy. Congress authorized federal courts to handle prize proceedings, creating a substantial wartime legal system.⁴
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutional foundation of the government's wartime authority in The Prize Cases (1863).
The Court upheld the government's blockade and recognized that a state of war could exist even without a formal declaration of war from Congress.⁵ But the decision also confirmed that captured property remained subject to judicial proceedings.
Other nineteenth-century cases developed the principle further. In The Siren (1868), the Court considered the government's treatment of captured property, while later cases addressed the relationship between prize law, international law, and congressional authority.⁶
Prize courts therefore became an important meeting point between war powers, property rights, executive authority, and international law.
Why Prize Law Disappeared
Prize courts gradually faded from practical use. The United States continued to rely on prize proceedings into the Spanish-American War, but the system became increasingly obsolete as international law and modern naval warfare developed.² According to Bloomberg Law, prize courts have been largely unused since the Spanish-American War and entirely dormant since World War II.²
Modern sanctions enforcement created a different legal framework. Instead of treating captured ships primarily as wartime prizes, the federal government increasingly relied on civil forfeiture laws to seize vessels and assets connected to sanctions violations.²
That distinction matters because forfeiture and prize proceedings arise from different legal authorities. Civil forfeiture generally concerns property connected to violations of domestic law. Prize jurisdiction historically concerns property captured as part of armed conflict.
The government's attempt to revive prize law therefore represents more than a change in courtroom procedure. It represents a return to an older conception of wartime property.
The Modern Iranian Oil Question
The Justice Department's proposed use of prize courts arises from an entirely different strategic and legal environment.
Bloomberg Law reports that the government wants prize proceedings to provide a faster route to transferring captured Iranian-linked vessels and oil to U.S. ownership, with proceeds ultimately going to the Treasury.² The Justice Department has described prize law as an ancient body of maritime law that could allow federal courts to adjudicate the disposition of captured enemy property.
The legal advantages are obvious from the government's perspective. Civil forfeiture proceedings can involve competing claims from shipping companies, financial institutions, victims, and other third parties.² Prize jurisdiction could provide a more direct framework for determining whether property captured during an armed conflict belongs to the United States.
But the very age of the doctrine creates a problem. A legal mechanism designed for nineteenth-century warfare must now interact with modern international law, modern shipping arrangements, sanctions law, and contemporary due-process requirements.
The Constitutional Question
Reviving prize jurisdiction also raises a fundamental constitutional issue: Who has the authority to decide what happens to captured property?
The Constitution gives Congress the power to "declare War" and to make rules concerning captures on land and water.⁷ The executive branch commands the armed forces, while Article III establishes the federal judiciary.⁸
Prize law historically operated at the intersection of all three. The military could capture property. Congress could establish the legal framework. Courts could determine whether the capture was lawful.
That arrangement reflects separation of powers in unusually concrete form. Military action may begin the process, but the judiciary determines the legal consequences. A modern revival would therefore test whether those old constitutional relationships remain workable.
The Problem of International Law
There is another complication. Prize law did not develop in isolation. It was historically intertwined with the law of nations, maritime customs, and international agreements governing neutral and enemy property.²
The modern international legal environment is considerably more developed than it was during the Civil War. Neutral vessels may have complicated ownership structures. Cargo may belong to parties unrelated to the country where a vessel is registered. Oil may be subject to sanctions while still being claimed by private companies.
A court therefore could face difficult questions that nineteenth-century judges rarely encountered:
Who actually owns the cargo?
Was the vessel an enemy vessel?
Was the capture authorized by Congress?
What rights belong to neutral owners?
And what happens when domestic wartime authority conflicts with international legal obligations?
The Case for Revival
Supporters of the revival can make a strong argument.
The government needs a lawful mechanism for dealing with property captured during armed conflict. If existing civil-forfeiture procedures are poorly suited to the circumstances, prize law may provide a historically established alternative.
More importantly, using courts rather than purely executive action could provide judicial oversight.
A captured vessel would not simply become American property because an executive agency declared it so. A federal judge would oversee the legal proceedings. In that sense, reviving prize courts could strengthen rather than weaken the rule of law.
The Case Against Revival
The opposing argument is that ancient legal authority cannot simply be revived because modern law is inconvenient.
Prize law developed under circumstances fundamentally different from modern sanctions enforcement. The distinction between enemy property and neutral property is more complicated, shipping ownership is more fragmented, and international law has evolved substantially.
There is also a danger that the government could use the language of wartime capture to expand powers that would otherwise be unavailable under ordinary domestic law. That makes judicial scrutiny essential.
The question should not be whether prize law once existed. It should be whether the Constitution and modern law still authorize the government to use it in this particular context.
Why It Matters
The Court of Prizes matters because it demonstrates how constitutional law can preserve institutions long after the circumstances that created them have disappeared.
Prize courts were not designed for today's world. Yet their underlying principle remains recognizable: government seizure of property should have a legal process behind it. The current proposal therefore presents two competing dangers.
The first is allowing old wartime powers to operate without sufficient attention to modern constitutional and international constraints. The second is assuming that an old legal doctrine has no place in the modern world simply because it has rarely been used. The courts may ultimately have to decide which principle carries greater weight.
Conclusion
Prize law is a legal relic, but relics can become relevant when circumstances change. The Justice Department's effort to revive prize-court proceedings demonstrates that old constitutional mechanisms can return when modern problems expose gaps in existing law.²
Yet historical legitimacy is not enough. If the United States uses prize law to seize modern commercial vessels and cargo, courts will have to determine whether the doctrine fits within today's Constitution, statutes, and international legal obligations.
The deeper lesson is about the durability of American law. The Constitution does not become modern simply because the world does. Sometimes the oldest legal questions return in the newest forms.
U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps, historical materials concerning prize jurisdiction and wartime captures.
Ben Penn, US Aims to Revive Civil War-Era Court to Claim Iran Oil as Prize, Bloomberg Law (Aug. 26, 2026). Bloomberg Law reports that DOJ is preparing to revive prize-court proceedings for captured Iranian oil vessels and cargo and that prize courts have been largely unused since the Spanish-American War.
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670–71 (1863).
Act of March 12, 1863, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 820; see also historical federal prize jurisdiction during the Civil War.
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668–70 (1863).
The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152 (1868).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 10–11.
U.S. CONST. arts. II–III.
Comments